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CASE COMMENT
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEFINING THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014)
Neeta Romot*
I. FACTS
The plaintiffs, former child slaves from the Ivory Coast, brought a
class action against defendants, four prominent corporations in the
Ivorian cocoa market, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California under the Alien Tort Statute' (ATS) for aiding and abetting
child slavery in the Ivory Coast.2 The ATS claim alleged that the
defendants did so by providing financial and non-financial assistance to
Ivorian farmers.3 The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that
corporations cannot be sued under the ATS and that the plaintiffs failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.4 On appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendants argued to dismiss
the plaintiffs' claim because there is no specific, universal, and obligatory
norm preventing corporations from aiding and abetting slave labor.5 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the motion to dismiss, then remanded
the case back to district court.6 The Ninth Circuit HELD a claim filed
under the ATS is given jurisdiction because the cause of action is derived
from federal common law, and corporations can be held liable for aiding
and abetting slave labor because the prohibition against slavery is
universal.'
* J.D. Candidate at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2017. She received
her B.S. from University of Florida in 2009. She dedicates this Comment to her husband,
daughter, and parents for their continued love and support.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015). The ATS reads, "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
2. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 1020.
4. Id. at 1018.
5. Id at 1020.
6. Id. at 1016.
7. Id. at 1018, 1022.
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II. HISTORY
The ATS remained dormant for nearly 200 years before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reignited its utility within the U.S.
Court system in the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.8 In Filartiga, the
plaintiffs, citizens of Paraguay, brought action under the ATS against the
defendant, also a citizen of Paraguay, for torturing and killing their son.9
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds of
subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.10 The district court
reluctantly granted the motion to dismiss, holding that although the
plaintiff's argument was strong it should be dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds." The issue on appeal was whether the alleged conduct violated
the law of nations.12 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal, ruling that deliberate torture committed by a state actor violates
the universally accepted norms of the international law." The court
reasoned that international law should be interpreted among the nations
of the world today, rather than at the time the statute was written.14
Considering that the act of torture has been universally renounced in the
modern usage and practice of nations, the court concluded that official
torture is prohibited by the law of nations and, therefore, an international
issue that confers federal jurisdiction.'5
While Filartiga brought the ATS back to life, the U.S. Supreme Court
first addressed the ATS in the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.16 In Sosa,
the plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, brought action against the defendant
under the ATS alleging that an arbitrary arrest is a violation of the law of
nations.17 The district court ruled in favor of the defendant, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgment.'8 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to remedy
under the ATS because his claim was not specific enough to be
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 879.
11. Id. at 880.
12. Id. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the thirteen colonies were bound to
observe and construe the accepted norms of international law, they referred to this policy as the
law of nations. Id. at 877. Upon ratification of the Constitution, First Congress embedded the law
of nations in the ATS. Id. at 878.
13. Id. at 878.
14. Id at 881.
15. Id at 884-85.
16. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
17. Id. at 698. The action was based on a prior case where the plaintiff was indicted by a
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considered an international norm.19 The Court explained that the ATS is
a jurisdictional statute which grants jurisdiction on the understanding that
common law would provide a cause of action for international law
violations.20 The Court determined that the intent of the ATS was to
recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law
of nations.2 1 The Court established that the criteria for accepting a cause
of action under the ATS should be based on: (1) whether the claim rests
on a norm of international character; and (2) whether the claim is defined
with specificity comparable to features of the three primary offenses22
considered by First Congress when the ATS was written.23 The Court
cautioned that there is an "element of judgment" involved with this rule,
warning lower courts of the practical consequences of making new causes
available to litigants in the federal courts.24 Ultimately, the Court found
that a new cause of action must be specific, universal, and obligatory.25
In Sosa, the Supreme Court alluded to the fact that prohibitions of
international norms could also apply to private actors, such as
corporations.2 6 International law does not specifically express whether
corporations can be held liable for violations of international norms.27
The Ninth Circuit answered this question in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.28 In
Sarei the plaintiffs, residents of Papua New Guinea, brought action
against the defendants, a corporation from Papua New Guinea, for several
crimes including genocide and aiding and abetting war crimes.29 One
issue before the court was whether the ATS grants jurisdiction for a claim
against a corporation.30 The court held that there is no statutory limitation
under the ATS that excludes corporate liability. 31 It set forth the norm-
by-norm analysis structure to determine whether a corporation can be
held liable for claims brought under the ATS.32 First, the court must
determine whether the violation alleged is a specific, universal, and
19. Id at 725.
20. Id at 724.
21. Id at 694.
22. Id. The three offenses are: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.
23. Id at 725.
24. Id at 733-34.
25. Id. at 733.
26. Id. at 732 n.20.
27. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)(finding
that international law only explicitly recognizes individual liability for the violation of specific,
universal, and obligatory norms of the customary international law of human rights).
28. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2011).
29. Id. at 743.
30. Id. at 746.




Romot: International Law: Defining the Alien Tort Statute, Doe I v. Nest
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDAJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
obligatory internationally accepted norm as per Sosa.33 If the claim
satisfies the first condition, the court will then consider whether a
corporation can be held liable by considering the universal nature of the
prohibition and whether it extends to the perpetrators.34 If the norm is
found to be applicable to all actors, then a corporation can be held liable.3 5
In situations where a claim alleges aiding and abetting, the character
defining the aiding and abetting claim must also be an acceptable
international norm.36
III. INSTANT CASE
In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision to grant the defendants motion to dismiss.3 7 The court held that
slave labor is a universal international norm which relief could be granted
under the ATS.3 8 As a result, the court held that corporations can be held
liable under the alleged claim.39
First, the court affirmed that the ATS is purely a jurisdictional
statute.4 0 To determine a cause of action under the statute, courts must
look to the federal common law.4 1 The court acknowledged that the ATS
was originally intended to grant jurisdiction over tort claims seeking
relief for only three violations: piracy, violation of safe conducts, and
infringement of the rights of ambassadors.4 2 However, under
contemporary international law, federal courts may permit plaintiffs to
pursue claims under the ATS for other violations as long as they are
specific, universal, and obligatory international norms.4 3
Second, the court found the prohibition of slave labor to be a universal
international norm.4 4 The court and the parties looked to three primary
sources of international law,4 5 all unanimously stating that all actors,
33. Id.
34. Id Enforcing a norm against corporations does not rely on the existence of international
precedence. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 748-49. See also, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 30 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (explaining that because aiding and abetting liability implicates the character of the specific
conduct, the conduct must also represent a violation of an international law norm).
37. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014).
38. Id. at 1022.
39. Id.




44. Id. at 1022.
45. Id. at 1020. The instant court referred to World War II International Military Tribunal
at Nuremburg, International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the
162 [Vol. 28
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whether state or private, can be held liable for perpetrating the act of
slavery.4 6
By finding that slave labor is a universal international norm, the court
consequently found that corporations can be held liable under the ATS.4
7
The court followed the norm-by-norm analysis to determine corporate
liability.48 In doing so, it affirmed that universal norms can be the basis
for corporate liability, and that corporate liability does not depend on
whether or not corporations have been held liable in the past.4 9
IV. ANALYSIS
The controversy around the ATS stems from the fact that, since its
enactment, it has rarely been exercised.so The minimal use of the ATS
causes many courts to question the true intent of the statute at the time of
its enactment and whether a modern interpretation would cause the courts
to stray, resulting in substantive changes to the law.5 1
In deciding the instant case, the district court chose to follow the most
conservative interpretation of the ATS by ruling aiding and abetting slave
labor is not a cause of action for which relief could be granted, and even
if it was, corporations could not be held liable under the ATS anyway.5 2
Citing Sosa, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.
5 3
The decision of the Ninth Circuit further exemplifies the freedom
given to the lower courts by the Supreme Court in Sosa. Although the
rule in Sosa appeared to be strict, by requiring that contemporary
international norms underlying a proposed ATS claim be "specific,
universal, and obligatory," the Supreme Court left too much room for
lower courts to make substantive changes to federal law without the
permission of Congress.5 4 When the ATS was enacted, it was intended to
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Id.
46. Id at 1022.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id at 1021.
50. Id. at 1018.
51. See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (questioning
whether the ATS should be interpreted the same as when it was enacted or as it has evolved under
modem law); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715-21 (2004) (explaining that ATS must
derive causes of action under federal common law). But see Id. at 739-50 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(finding that the ATS was written during a time of general common law, which is not the same as
federal common law, and therefore the ATS does not allow a cause of action to rise from federal
common law).
52. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014).
53. Id. at 1016.
54. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cover only three violations of international law.5 Today, the list of
aceptable violations includes genocide, war crimes, torture, supporting
terrorism, aiding and abetting, and, after the instant case, slave labor. The
Court in Sosa warned the federal courts that, when considering new
causes of action, the courts should use "discretion" and an "element of
judgment" about the practical consequences of making that cause
available to litigants in the future.56 However, these two factors are not
nearly as objective or stringent as they should be in order to keep the ATS
under strict guidelines. The vague acknowledgement of potential
consequences may only lead to confrontation with domestic political
branches57 as well as conflict among different nations by overreaching
the proverbial judicial hand.
Considering the high risk of adverse foreign policy consequences
involved in ATS cases, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case neglected to
clearly explain what made slave labor a universal, specific, and obligatory
international norm. The parties in the instant case referred to three
different sources of international law and, although the court considered
them all to be proper sources, it only allowed the parties to build a case
for whether slave labor is considered universal for purposes of corporate
liability."
The Ninth Circuit claimed to follow the norm-by-norm analysis from
Sarei, but used a minimally different approach with the potential for
magnified consequences. In Sarei, the Ninth Circuit discussed each claim
individually by first finding whether it satisfied the Sosa standard, then
determining corporate liability, and finally finding whether there was a
sufficient cause of action.59 For example, the court accepted genocide as
an international norm.6 0 It came to this conclusion by defining genocide
to ensure the claim was specific; it then referenced the international
source, finding genocide to be a universally recognized definition which
had been ratified by more than 140 nations, including the United States;
and finally by acknowledging the fact that genocide has been
criminalized by all international criminal tribunals, the court found
genocide to be obligatory.61
By only specifically pointing out that slave labor is a universally
55. Doe, 766 F.3d at 1019.
56. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, 737.
57. See id. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the courts making jurisdictional
provisions without clear indication from the legislative or executive branches).
58. E.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Khulumani
v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring)) (stating
that aiding and abetting liability implicates the character of the specific conduct allegedly
committed by the defendants sued).
59. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 758-70 (9th Cir. 2011).
60. Id. at 759.
61. Id. at 758-59.
164 [Vol. 28
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accepted international norm, the Ninth Circuit effectively disregarded the
rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Sosa; which required that in order
for an international norm to be accepted as a new cause of action under
the ATS it must be universal, specific, and obligatory.
The consequence of this oversight results in a merging of the claims
of "aiding and abetting" and "slave labor" into one. The character (slave
labor) of the aiding and abetting claim must also satisfy the Sosa standard
in order for the entire claim to proceed.6 2
The consequence of the Ninth Circuit's action in this case has the
potential to allow for an influx of cases alleging aiding and abetting
liability for any claims of any character, regardless of whether they can
be considered international norms. As demonstrated in the instant case,
the universal standard is relatively easy to prove. It is the specific and
obligatory nature of the international norm that controls the scope of the
ATS. The Supreme Court in Sosa stressed that the ATS was meant to
address a modest number of international norms.6 3 International norms
that confer jurisdiction under the ATS have tripled since Filartiga.64
V. CONCLUSION
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., is an example of how the lower courts
misunderstood and misappropriated the rule set forth in Sosa. The
requirement that international norms must be "universal, specific, and
obligatory" was meant to restrain the jurisdictional reach of the ATS. The
ease at which the Ninth Circuit was able to conclude slave labor as a new
cause of action under the ATS should lead one to question whether the
lower courts will respect the warnings the Supreme Court expressed in
Sosa.
The ruling in this case will inevitably allow the number of
international norms to increase. As international norms increase, the
potential for foreign conflict rises. Doe demonstrates the need for clear
and concise rule making by the Supreme Court, especially in cases
involving statutes that are brief and have a limited history.
62. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d I1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
63. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 720 (2004).
64. See id. at 724 (finding that First Congress intended for the ATS to confer jurisdiction
over three offenses of piracy, violation of safe conducts, and infringement of the rights of
ambassadors); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that
official torture is prohibited by the law of nations); see also Khulamani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that defendants can be held liable under
international law for aiding and abetting); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 759,
764 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding genocide and war crimes to be universal, specific, and obligatory
international norms that confer jurisdiction under the ATS).
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The Florida Journal of International Law is a scholarly publication
devoted to timely discussion of international legal issues. Its subscribers
include legal scholars and practitioners from around the world. The
Journal publishes three times a year and is one of four co-curricular
journals produced at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College
of Law. On occasion, the Journal will also have Special Editions that
can be purchased in addition to its subscription.
The Journal selects its editorial board and staff from the top ten percent
of students at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law
and from winners of the open write-on competition held once per year.
The Journal enables students to earn academic credit while honing their
legal research and writing skills. Recent articles published or accepted
for publication have treated subjects as varied as International Trade
and Commerce law, Human Rights law, Terrorism, National Security,
War Crimes Tribunals, International Environmental law, International
Intellectual Property, and Maritime law.
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